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 Real networks are often subjected to failures and attacks. Real networks are found to be 
robust to errors and vulnerable to attacks. This behavior of real networks is attributed to their 
non-homogeneous degree distribution. Non-homogenous networks are also known as scale free 
networks. Real networks along with the scale free property show high modularity.  
 
Many network models have been proposed to model real networks. Erdos-Renyi 
Random network model is the first attempt, but fails to incorporate both properties - scale free as 
well as the high modularity of the real networks. Small world model shows high clustering but 
lacks non-homogeneous distribution. The scale free network model has non-homogeneous 
degree distribution but lacks the modularity. In 2002, Ravasz and Barabasi proposed a 
Hierarchical Network model that combines non-homogeneous degree distribution as well as 
high modularity showed by real networks. 
 
The objective of this research is to study the error and attack tolerance of different 
network models. The static as well as dynamic tolerances of attacks are analyzed. The effect of 
an attack on the network model is quantified by considering the dynamic flows of quantities 
and using the impact factors. The results of the study show that though the scale free as well as 
the hierarchical models are vulnerable to attacks, the performance can be highly secured by 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
 Many real networks are often subjected to failures and attacks. Most of the real 
networks can be represented as complex networks consisting of nodes connected by 
edges. Many models have been proposed for real complex networks. The availability of 
topological data on large real networks led to the study of generic aspects of network 
structure. The existing empirical and theoretical results indicate that complex networks 
can be divided into two major classes based on the degree distribution of the networks 
[6]. Homogeneous networks have a Poisson degree distribution and non-homogeneous 
networks have a power law degree distribution. The non-homogeneous networks are also 
called as scale free networks. Empirical results show that many complex real networks 
like WWW, Internet, etc, show a power degree distribution. Ravasz and Barabasi [18] 
showed that the real networks show high modularity along with the power degree 
distribution and proposed a Hierarchical Network model that combines both the key 
characteristics of real networks.  
 
Previous research emphasized the study of error and attack tolerances of real 
network models [2] [6]. The analysis was performed on two network models, Random 
networks (with homogeneous degree distribution) and Scale free networks (with non-
homogeneous degree distribution). The results showed that the scale free networks are 
vulnerable to attacks. Initial analysis consisted of only static analysis, Motter and  Lai 
[15] proposed a model considering the dynamic properties of networks. It was shown that 
a single attack can lead to a potential network breakdown by considering the dynamic 
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properties of networks. The results showed that the cascading effect of an attack is higher 
in scale free networks than the random networks making them vulnerable to potential 
single attacks that can cause a global network breakdown. 
 
 This study models error and attack tolerance of hierarchical networks and 
compares the performance to Random and Scale free network models. The hierarchical 
networks are unique in the sense that they show high modularity along with the power 
degree distribution, a feature shown by real networks. Previous error and attack analysis 
[2] [6] based their study on a full degree attack rendering a node completely useless. 
Partial attacks exist in real world and we aim to provide similar analysis for different 
degree of attacks and show how their vulnerability to attacks can be reduced. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
• To study static and dynamic tolerances of different network models. 
• To study the performance of different network topologies in both normal and 
partial attacks. 
• To quantify the effect of network topology on error and attack tolerance of 
network models based on model for partial attacks. 
• To quantify the effect of an attack on a network using the impact factors - System 
Impact Factor (SIF) and Component Impact Factor (CIF).  
• To investigate methods of improving the performance of the real networks. 
• To provide a framework for an overall analysis of robustness of a given network. 
 
 2
CHAPTER II: NETWORK TOPOLOGIES 
 
 
 This chapter provides an introduction to different network topologies for 
modeling real networks. It provides the reader with necessary background on the network 
models and their key characteristics. The first section of the chapter provides an 
explanation of all the terms used throughout this report. Each characteristic term is 
explained along with its significance. The last section of the chapter provides an 
explanation of existing network topologies and their key characteristics.  
 
2.1 CHACTERISTICS OF NETWORKS 
 
 
2.1.1 Degree  
The degree  of a node denotes the number of edges it has or the number of 
neighboring nodes it is connected. The average degree 
ik
>< k  is the average of degrees of 






where is the degree of node i and  is the size of the network. ik N
Significance: The significance of average degree >< k is that it defines the average 
number of edges each node has in a network. It defines the average number of neighbors 
for each node in a network. 
 
2.1.2 Shortest Path 
 
The small-world concept describes that despite their large size, there exists a 
relatively short path between any two nodes [1]. The shortest path between a source node 
 3
and a destination node is the least number of hops or minimum number of edges 
traversed to get from source to destination. There may be a number of ways to travel 
from a source to a destination, but the shortest path would be the path where it has to pass 
through the least possible edges to get to the destination. In case of graphs where the 
edges have a weight associated with them, the shortest path would be the path with least 
weight (added weights of the edges through which it traverses). Therefore by definition 
the shortest path between node i  and node  represented by . And if there exists a 
direct edge connecting  and , then the shortest path between these nodes is . 
j 1≥ijd
i j 1=ijd
Significance: The significance of the shortest path is that in a large complex network, the 
connectedness of two nodes can be represented by the path length. Path length is the least 
number of edges from source to destination. The larger the path length, the smaller is the 
connectedness. Presence of a shortest path decreases the path length and in a way 
increases connectedness. The presence of a large number of short paths between number 
of nodes makes a network more connected. It makes the communication in the network 
easier.  
 
2.1.3 Average Path Length 
 
The average path length is the average of all shortest paths between all possible 
pairs of source and destination in a network graph. It is also called the characteristic path 










where  is the shortest path between node i  and node   ijd j
   and  is the total number of nodes in the network. N
This equation is valid only if the network is totally connected, and only if all the nodes in 
the network are reachable. If a node, suppose , is not reachable from then the 




Significance: The significance of the average path length is that it measures the 
separation of two generic nodes in a network. It characterizes the connectedness of the 
whole network. In a way it characterizes the communication of the network. If the 
average path length is small, the network is closely connected and the communication is 
easy and vice versa. 
 
2.1.4 Clustering Coefficient 
 
Forming of cliques, a circle of acquaintances in which one member knows every 
other member, is a common property of social networks. This tendency to form clusters 
can be defined in a quantitative manner using the clustering coefficient. For a node i in a 
network, suppose there are  edges connected to  other nodes. There would be at most 
 edges between these nearest neighbors, if they were part of a clique. The 
clustering coefficient of node i is defined as the ratio between the number of edges  















where  is the actual number of edges connecting the neighbor nodes,  iE
    and  is the degree of node i. ik
The clustering coefficient of the whole network is obtained by averaging all 
individual ’s. Similarly, the average of ’s of all nodes (i’s) with degree  gives the 




Significance: The clustering coefficient measures average cliquishness of a node. A 
higher clustering coefficient value indicates the presence of a highly connected cluster 
with the maximum value for the clustering coefficient being ‘1’ if all the neighbor nodes 
are connected to each other. Suppose for nodes with degree  the clustering coefficient is 
higher than the nodes with degree . It means that higher density clusters are formed for 





2.1.5 Degree Distribution 
 
The degree distribution of a network defines how the degree is distributed over 
the whole network. It defines how many numbers of nodes have a given degree. Suppose 
is the probability that a given node has the degree , then the plot of the 
probabilities as function of the degree k  will give the degree distribution of a network. In 
)(kP k
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a network of degree , the probability  is given byk )(kP
N
n
kP k=)( , where is the 
number of nodes with degree k  and  is the total number of nodes in the network. 
kn
N
Significance: The degree distribution of a network specifies how different degrees are 
distributed in the whole network. If a large number of nodes have the same degree then 
the network can be termed as a homogeneous network. For such networks, is higher 
for a specific degree  and average degree
)(kP
k kk >≅< . Similarly if is distributed over 
 with some nodes having one degree  and other nodes having a different degree , 






Efficiency ijε  is described as ijij d/1=ε  where is the shortest distance between 




















where  is the shortest path between nodes and   ijd i j
    and  is the total size of the network. N
Significance: The main advantage of efficiency ijε is that when there is no path in a 
graph between nodes i and , as discussed abovej +∞=** jid  and as a result 0=ijε . 
Therefore  quantifies the communication in a network. If  of a network is 
high, the communication in the network is good.  
globE globE
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2.2 NETWORK TOPOLOGIES 
 
Traditionally graph theory has been used to study complex networks. Since 
1950’s large scale graphs with no design principles have been described using random 
graphs. But in the past few years, there have been advances in this field and many new 
concepts have been proposed. Out of these advances, three concepts occupy a prominent 
place in contemporary thinking about complex networks: Small worlds, Clustering and 
Degree distribution, leading to three main network modeling paradigms [1].  
 
  Variant models of original Random graphs. These are still widely used for 
modeling many networks. 
 Small-world models which are motivated by clustering.  
 Scale-free models which are based on the power-law degree distribution. 
 
Additionally there is a fourth type of network model, the hierarchical network model 
proposed by Ravasz and Barabasi [18]. Like the real networks, the model shows both 
high clustering and high modularity. The four network topologies namely Random 
Graphs, Small-World Models, Scale-free Networks and Hierarchical Networks will be 
described using the key characteristics such as Degree Distribution, Average Path Length 





2.2.1 Random Networks 
 
Random graphs are used to study Complex networks with unknown organizing 
principles as they often appear random. The theory of random graphs was introduced by 
Paul Erdos and Alfred Renyi (1959, 1960, and 1961). In their model, Erdos and Renyi 
defined a random graph as  labeled nodes connected by n edges, which are chosen 
randomly from  possible edges. As the probability that any node in a random 
graph is connected to its neighbor is equal to the probability that any two nodes in the 





pCrand == . 
where k  is the average degree and is the size of the network. N
 
a) Degree Distribution 
Degree distribution of the graph is obtained by studying the number of nodes with 
degree k . The number of nodes with degree  is given by the probability of , . 
The number of nodes with degree k follows a Poisson distribution for random networks. 
Figure 2.1[1] shows the degree distribution of a numerical simulation of a random graph 







Fig 2.1 Degree Distribution for Random Network 


























This indicates that the network is homogeneous, with a large number of nodes having 
approximately same number of edges (i.e. degree ‘k’). 
 
b) Average Path Length 
The diameter of a network is the average of all shortest path lengths between all pairs of 
nodes in the network. This characterizes the connectedness of a network. The average 






c) Clustering Coefficient 
In a random graph if we consider a node and its nearest neighbors, the probability that 
two of these neighbors are connected is equal to the probability that two randomly 




pCrand ==  
This indicates that if we plot kCrand / as a function of , the graph will align along a 
straight line of slope . Thus the Random Graphs predict that the clustering coefficient 




2.2.2 Small World Models 
 
The real world networks have small-world characteristics (i.e. existence of the 
shortest path) and usually have large clustering coefficient [1][21][22]. Earlier it is shown 
that the clustering coefficient in real networks is independent of the size of the 
network. This is a characteristic of ordered lattices, whose clustering coefficient is 
independent of size . 
N
N
Watts and Strogatz (1998) proposed a one-parameter model that interpolates 
between an ordered finite-dimensional lattice and a random graph. It is known as the WS 





a. Degree Distribution 
In the Small-World model proposed by Watts-Strogatz, each node has the same degree k  
and hence the WS model has a Poisson degree distribution similar to random graph. The 
topology of this type of network is relatively homogeneous, with all nodes having 
approximately same number of edges. 
 
b. Average Path Length 
The WS model has a change in the scaling of the characteristic path length l. For small p, 
l scales linearly with system size, while for large p the scaling is logarithmic. The origin 
of rapid drop in l is the appearance of shortcuts between nodes. Every shortcut, created 
randomly, is likely to connect widely separated parts of the graph, and thus has a 
significant path length of the entire graph. 
 
c. Clustering Coefficient 
In addition to a short average path length, small-world networks have a relatively high 
clustering coefficient. This is in accordance with the properties of real networks which 






2.2.3 Scale Free Networks 
 
Empirical results on real networks show that many large networks are scale free, 
i.e. their degree distribution follows a power law for large k. Even for the networks that 
show an exponential tail, the degree distribution significantly deviates from a Poisson 
distribution. Both the random graph model as well as the WS model cannot produce this 
feature. Assuming that if we capture the process of assembling networks correctly, we 
will attain their topology correctly, scale free networks emphasize on the network 
dynamics. 
 
The Barabasi-Albert {BA} Model [1] proposed for the scale-free models, is governed by 
two principles. 
 Real networks grow by continuous addition of new nodes making it an open 
system. This was not included in the two previous models, which start with fixed 
number of  vertices and are then connected or re-wired without modifying .  N N
 Most of the Real Networks follow preferential attachment while connecting to 
other nodes, making it dependent on the degree of a node. In the two previous 









a) Degree Distribution 
The main objective of the BA model was to obtain a scale-free network i.e. to obtain a 
network with a power law degree distribution. Figure 2.2[1] shows a degree distribution 
of a BA model with N = 300000 and m0 = 1. ‘m0’ is the number of nodes at the start, 
from where other nodes are added to build the system. 
 
 
Fig 2.2 Degree Distribution for BA Scale free Network  


































The graph in Figure 2.2[1] indicates that the number of nodes having large number of 
edges (high ‘k’) is less and decreases with ‘k’. It means that the number of nodes having 
fewer edges is very high. In scale-free networks few nodes are highly connected to hold 
the whole network together, and a large number of nodes are loosely connected. The 
scale-free model creates significantly heterogeneous networks. 
 
b) Average Path Length 
Figure 2.3[1] shows the comparison of average path length ‘l’, for the BA model and the 
random graph model with same average degree ‘k’ and size ‘N’. 
 
 
Fig: 2.3 Average Path Length for BA Scale free network 





































Figure 2.3 indicates that the average path length is smaller in case of the BA model, 
indicating that the non-homogeneous scale-free network topology has densely connected 
nodes than the homogeneous topology of the random graphs. 
 
c) Clustering Coefficient 
There is no analytical prediction for the clustering coefficient of this model. The 
clustering coefficient of a Barabasi-Albert model with average degree k  = 4 is 
compared with that of a Random graph. The plot of the clustering coefficients of these 
two models is shown in Figure 2.4[1]. Here we find that the clustering coefficient of 
Scale free model is five times higher than the random graph model and it slowly 
increases with number of nodes.  
 
Fig: 2.4 Clustering Coefficient of BA Scale free Network 
















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  

















The clustering coefficient of the Barabasi-Albert model decreases with increasing 
(network size) and follows a power law . Though this is slower than the 
decay for the random graph, it is still dependent on the network size and is in 





2.2.4 Hierarchical Networks 
 
As described above Real Networks in society and nature have two generic 
properties: they are scale-free and they display high degree of clustering [18]. Ravasz and 
Barabasi showed that these two features of the real networks is a consequence of a 
hierarchical organization - small groups of nodes hierarchically organize themselves to 
form increasingly large networks.   
 
The scale-free property and clustering are found together in a number of real 
networks, metabolic networks [11] [22], protein interaction network [22], World Wide 
Web [3] and even in some social networks [16] [5]. But as we have seen, most of the 
models that were proposed to describe the topology of the complex network do not 
capture both features. 
 
In this model Ravasz and Barabasi discuss that the hierarchical topology of the 
real networks is the feature that forms the root of the high degree of clustering and scale-
free topology. Hence for their model they assumed that modules combine into each other 
in a hierarchical manner to form a hierarchical network. The presence of hierarchy and 
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scale-free property impose strict restrictions on the number different groups present in the 
network along with their degree of cohesiveness. The number of groups can be 
quantitatively captured using a scaling law that describes the dependence of the clustering 
coefficient on the node degree [18]. The presence of hierarchy in real networks is 
identified using this scaling law. 
 
a) Degree Distribution:  
 
The hierarchical model has the scale-free feature of the BA model. Hence it has a power-
law degree distribution and produces a heterogeneous network model. 
 
Fig 2.5 Degree Distribution of Hierarchical Network 






























Figure 2.5[1] shows the degree distribution of a hierarchical network with N = 57. 
 
b) Clustering Coefficient 
 
The clustering coefficient of this model is independent of the size of the network ‘N’. 
 In [10], Dorogovtsev, Goltsev and Mendes explained that in deterministic scale-
free networks the clustering coefficient of a node with k links follows the scaling law 
1~)( −kkC  
Ravasz and Barabasi show that the intrinsic hierarchy can be characterized in a 
quantitative manner using this scaling law. They showed that for the hierarchical model 
proposed, the clustering coefficient C follows the 1/k rule. The clustering coefficient of a 
hierarchical network with N = 57 is shown in the Figure 2.6[1]. 


































Fig: 2.6 Clustering Coefficient of Hierarchical Network 
 
Figure 2.6[1] shows that  is inversely dependent on the degree . Hence this curve 
can be used to determine if there is a hierarchy present in a network. 
)(kC k
 
Figure 2.7[1] shows a plot of the clustering coefficient with respect to the size of the 
network ‘N’. Here we observe that for the hierarchical network model the clustering 
coefficient is independent of the size of the network. 
 
 
Fig: 2.7 Clustering Coefficient of Hierarchical Networks plotted 
against Size ‘N’ 





































Table 2.1 summarizes the properties of the four network topologies discussed above and 
compares them with properties of the real networks. 
 
Table 2.1 Overview of key characteristics of different network models 
 
Network Topology Degree Distribution P(k) Clustering Coefficient 
     Real Networks            Power-law       Independent of ‘N’ 
     Random Networks            Poisson       Dependent on ‘N’ 
     Small World Models            Poisson       Dependent on ‘N’ 
     Scale-Free Model            Power-law       Dependent on ‘N’ 
     Hierarchical Model            Power-law Independent of ‘N’ 
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Many complex systems show a high degree of tolerance against errors. For 
example many organisms of the metabolic system grow, persist and reproduce despite 
drastic pharmaceutical and environmental conditions [19]. Even with regular 
malfunctions of key features and local features the communication networks that are 
complex show a surprising degree of robustness. 
 
 This chapter provides an introduction to different attack models. It summarizes 
the literature on current research in the error and attacks analysis of different network 
models. The first section explains all the error and attack models used for assessing the 
performance of different network topologies. The last section provides brief summary of 
important research and their main results in error and attack analysis. 
 
3.2 ERROR AND ATTACK MODELS 
 
3.2.1 Error 
 Errors frequently occur in real networks. Many systems are subjected to failures 
that are unexpected, which cannot be accounted for in network models. Behavior of 
different network models under such failures is described. The errors or failures in a 
network are modeled by random removal of nodes. As failures occur randomly in real 
world, this model is appropriate. A removal of a node due to an error removes all the 
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edges of the node. The performance of the network is studied by determining the global 
efficiency of the network. 
 
3.2.2 Attack 
 Attack on a network is a deliberately planned and designed action to damage the 
integrity of a network. An attack on a network is usually planned in a way to damage a 
network to a maximum amount. Hence an attack is modeled by removing the most 
important node in the network. The importance of a node is determined in two different 
ways in a network. 
• K-Based: In the first approach, the importance of a node is based on the degree of 
the node. As explained earlier the degree of a node is the number of edges that 
pass through the node. It can also be quantified as the number of nodes to which it 
is directly connected. The node with highest degree is considered the node with 
highest importance. The node with the next highest degree is the node with the 
next importance and is chosen to attack, and so on. The performance of the 
network is  studied by determining  the global efficiency of the network. 
• L-Based: The second approach to determine the importance of a node is based on 
the load of the node. The load is also called as the betweenness of the node. The 
load of the node is the total number of paths that pass through the node. The loads 
of the node are calculated in the free-state i.e. when no nodes are removed. The 
node with highest load is selected as the node with highest importance. The node 
with next highest load is the second important, and so on. The performance of 
network is studied using the global efficiency of the network. 
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3.2.3 Cascade attack 
 
The previous two attack models (K-based and L-based) focus on the static 
properties of the network. But if the dynamic redistribution of flows is taken into account, 
a single attack on a node is sufficient to collapse the entire network. The effect of an 
attack can be more devastating if the intrinsic dynamics of the flows of quantity in a 
network is taken into account.  
 
The model followed is that in any network, initially when the network is fully 
functional i.e. in free-state each node carries some initial load. The load on a node is the 
total number of shortest paths passing through the node. We assume that the capacity of 
the node is proportional to the initial load of the node. It is given by  
,,2,1),0( NjLC jj K==α  
where 0≥α  is the tolerance parameter and N is the initial number of nodes.  
 
When a node in a network is made non-functional due to either a failure or an 
attack, changes in the flow of the quantities occur and eventually the load on each node 
also changes. This leads to global redistribution of load all over the network. It can cause 
overload failures for some nodes in the network which again leads to redistribution of 
loads. This phenomenon can continue until a network breakdown occurs. This kind of 
attack is known as cascade attacks. The method followed is that if the load after 
redistribution exceeds the capacity of a node, then the node is considered not functional. 
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The node is removed from the network, thereby removing all the edges of the node. This 















where  is the weight of the edge connecting nodes i and j. ije
  is the load on the node at time t. )(tLi
  is the initial capacity on node i.  iC
 
Cascading failures are common in most of the complex networks. The cascade 
attacks are present in many infrastructure networks.  
 
The parameters studied under this kind of attack model are: 
 The size of the main cluster of the network 
 The global efficiency of the network 
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3.3 ERROR AND ATTACK ANALYSIS 
 
3.3.1 Static Attack analysis 
 
For the first time [2], the authors studied the error and attack tolerances of two types 
of networks – ER random model and the BA model for scale-free networks. They 
compared the robustness of these two types of networks with same number of nodes and 
edges, differing only in degree distribution. Two types of node removal were considered. 
 
 Errors: These are the errors that may occur naturally. Vertices are randomly 
broken and disappear along with their connections (edges). 
 Attacks: These are damages that are caused by planned and designed attacks on 
the networks. The vertices are deliberately broken and the most important nodes 
are chosen based on some criteria.  
 
By removing a node, all the edges that connect to it are also removed, disrupting some of 
the paths between the remaining nodes. The attack on the networks is based on the degree 
of the node (k – based attack).  The parameters that are studied on the two types of the 
networks are the average path length (also called as the diameter) that describes the 
interconnectedness of a network and the size of the largest cluster as a fraction of the total 
system size.  
 The average path length characterizes the closeness or connectedness of a 
network and is defined as the average length  of the shortest paths between any l
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two nodes in the network. The smaller the diameter, the shorter is the expected 
path between the two nodes and hence has a better ability to communicate with 
each other. 
 The size of the largest cluster as a fraction of the total size characterizes the 
dependency of the network integrity on the degree distribution. After the removal 
of the nodes due to an attack, the relative size of the largest cluster that remains 
connected quantifies the dependency of the network on the effected nodes. The 
relative size of the largest cluster is given by the number of nodes in the cluster as 
a fraction of the total size of the network . Hence
S
N 10 ≤≤ S , with when 
there are no nodes removed. 
1=S
 
The main results and conclusions from their study are: 
a) The error and attack tolerances of the network are dependent on the 
topology of the network. 
b) There are two types of network topology – Poisson and Power law. 
c) Poisson distribution networks are homogeneous (Erdos-Random network) 
and their error and attack tolerance is almost similar. 
d) Power law distribution networks are non-homogeneous (BA network 
model) and are robust to errors and vulnerable to attacks. 
 
A similar study for the www as well as the Internet networks is also provided [2]. 
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In 2003, [7] the authors studied the effect of error and attack tolerance on the random 
graph model and the BA scale-free model. The attack on the networks is based on the 
load of the node (L-based attack). They studied the performance of these networks with 
the average path length , clustering coefficientC , and they introduced two more 
parameters – Global efficiency ( ), and Local efficiency ( ). These two 
parameters are described as follows: 
l
globE locE
 Global Efficiency ( ): A characteristic efficiencyglobE ijε  is described as 
ijij d/1=ε  where is the shortest distance between nodes and . The global 




















where  is the shortest path between nodes and  ijd i j
and  is the total size of the network. N
The main advantage of efficiency ijε is that when there is no path in a graph 
between nodes i and , j +∞=** jid  and 0=ijε . Therefore the  in a way 
quantifies the communication of a network. When  of a network is high, it 
specifies that the communication in the network is good. 
globE
globE
 Local Efficiency ( ): Local efficiency  is analogous to the clustering 







NE )(1)(  
 where  is the number of neighbors of the node’ i ’ in
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 and N is the total size of the network. 
The  quantifies the local communication, i.e. the communication between the 
neighbors of each node. 
locE
 
The main results and conclusions from their study are: 
a) The error and attack tolerances of a network is dependent on the topology 
of the network. 
b) Poisson distribution networks are homogeneous (Erdos-Random network) 
and their error and attack tolerance is almost similar. 
c) Power law distribution networks which are non-homogeneous (BA 
network model) are robust to errors and vulnerable to attacks. 
d) The usage of the efficiency is better than that of the average path length 
(L). 
 
3.3.2 Cascade Attack Analysis 
 
The previous K-based and L-based attacks mainly study the static properties. But 
the effect can be more devastating if the intrinsic dynamics of the flows of quantity in a 
network is taken into account [15]. In any network, each node has an initial node. When a 
node in a network is damaged, due to either a failure or an attack, the flow of the 
quantities and hence the load of each node changes. This leads to global redistribution of 
loads all over the network and can cause overload failures for some nodes in the network 
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that again leads to redistribution of loads. If this phenomenon continues, then it causes a 
network to breakdown. This kind of attack is known as cascade attacks. 
 
In 2002 [15], A. E. Motter and Y. C. Lai first proposed a dynamical model to 
study the cascade-based attacks on complex networks. They studied the changes in the 
size of the main cluster due to the effect of an attack to show the effect. The model 
proposed is as follows: 
 
Suppose in a given network, at each time step of one unit a relevant quantity is 
exchanged between every pair of nodes along the shortest path [15]. The load of any node 
is the total number of shortest paths passing through that node. Every node has a capacity 
which is the maximum load the node can handle at any instance. The capacity is limited 
by cost. In their model Motter and Lai assumed that the capacity of node is proportional 
to the initial load of the node. 
,,2,1,)1( NjLC jj K=+= α  
where 0≥α  is the tolerance parameter and N is the initial number of nodes. 
 
 Under normal conditions the system works in free-flow state. But removal of a 
node results in redistribution of the shortest paths and the load at a node can exceed the 
capacity resulting in failure of the node. In this manner, the cascades triggered by single 
node removal are modeled. The main results are: 
a) The real networks are robust to failures but are vulnerable to attacks due to 
the presence of few nodes with large exponential load. 
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b) By taking the dynamic flows of a network into consideration, the attacks 
with cascading effect can be more devastating than the normal K-based 
and L-based attacks. 
 
In 2004, Crucitti et al [6] proposed a dynamical model for the cascading effects of 
an attack. They studied the efficiency to show the effect of an attack. The method 
proposed is as follows: 
 
Similar to the model proposed by Motter and Lai, here the authors assume that the 
capacity of a node is proportional to the initial load of the node, where load is the total 
number of shortest paths passing through the node. Hence capacity can be given by  
,,2,1),0( NjLC jj K==α  
where 1≥α is the tolerance parameter of the network 
and is the load at time 0, initial load. )0(jL
 
This is realistic as the capacity of a network cannot be infinitely large because it is 
limited by cost. The network initially operates in a satisfactory state. But removing a 
node can cause redistribution of paths and loads, creating overloads at some nodes. The 





























where  is the weight of the edge connecting nodes i and j. ije
  is the load on the node at time t. )(tLi
  is the initial capacity on node i.  iC
 
and j extends to all the first neighbors of i. If at any time t a node is congested, the load 
exceeds the capacity of a node, the efficiency of all the edges passing through the node is 
reduced, so that eventually the information takes alternate paths. The important results 
are: 
a) The cascading effect can lead to system breakdown if the node that is 
attacked is one with higher loads in the network. 
b) This is particularly important for real-world networks with highly 
heterogeneous distribution like the Internet. 
 
 
3.3.3 Impact Analysis 
 
In 2003, Salim et al [19] proposed an online monitoring and analysis framework, 
formulating a theoretical basis for constructing global metrics for impact analysis. An 
agent-based architecture is presented that continuously monitors network vulnerability 
metrics. It provides new ways to measure the impact of faults and attacks, and for 
monitoring and quantifying component behavior [19]. Two metrics are proposed to 
quantify the impact of a fault or an attack at the component or at the system level.  
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Component Impact Factor (CIF): The impact on individual network components can 
be characterized and quantified using the CIF. It can be defined as the ratio between the 
changes occurred due to the fault to the minimum change required to change the network 







where is the fault scenario. kFS
Norm  is the value of the parameter observed under the normal working condition 
Fault  is the value of the parameter observed under the faulty working condition 
Min is the least changed value of the parameter to make the system work in abnormal 
state 
 
We can select the parameter and also set the threshold for obtaining the quantitative 
values to represent the normal, fault and minimum operating conditions. For example 
Salim and Ramkishore [19] calculated Component Impact Factor for an example network 
of the Internet level (synthesized) and used three different parameters – data transfer rate, 
buffer utilization, and connection queue length. Different thresholds were selected for 
different parameters.  
 
System Impact Factor: The impact of a fault on the whole network can be characterized 
and quantified using SIF. It is obtained by evaluating the weighted impact factors of all 
network components [19]. That is, SIF gives the percentage of components operating in 
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vulnerable state (components whose CIF’s exceed normal operating thresholds), 












where ‘d’ is the threshold and COS denotes the components operating state. COS is ‘1’ if 
the component is not operating in normal state (i.e. ) and it is equal to ‘0’ if it is 
operating in normal condition (i.e.
dCIF >
dCIF < ). 
The important results of their work are: 
a) The parameters CIF (component impact factor) and SIF (system impact 
factor) were defined. 
b) They proposed a model to monitor the performance of a network system 
by keeping track of these parameters online. 
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CHAPTER IV: CHARACTERISTICS OF TEST NETWORKS  
 
 This chapter explains the networks used in this research for the study of error and 
attack tolerance. It explains the different networks used and how they are generated along 
with their important properties – degree distribution and clustering coefficient. The next 
section of the chapter explains the representation and generation of networks used. The 
last section explains the network properties along with their significance. 
 
4.1 GENERATION/SYNTHESIS OF TEST NETWORKS 
 
4.1.1 Network Representation: 
 
A network can be represented in several ways – adjacency list, adjacency matrix, 
etc. Here the networks are represented in adjacency matrix form. A brief explanation 
about adjacency and adjacency matrix is given in the section below.  
 
Adjacency: Two nodes in a graph are called adjacent if they are the endpoints associated 
with same arc/branch/edge. 
 The adjacency matrix is the matrix that defines the connectivity between the 
nodes of a network. If there are ‘N’ numbers of nodes in a network, then the size of the 
adjacency matrix would be N X N. 
Each element of the matrix would be of value ‘0’ or ‘1’. A value of zero denotes 
that there is no connection between nodes represented by the row and column number of 
the element. If there is a connection then a value of one is used. 
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Nodes 1 2 3 4 
1 0 1 1 0 
2 1 0 1 1 
3 1 1 0 1 
4 0 1 1 0 
i = 1 [Row] 
j = 4 [Column] 
 
i = 4 [Row] 
j = 2 [Column] 
 
 Fig 4.1 An example of a network and its adjacency matrix 
 
In the adjacency matrix, the highlighted ‘0’ shows that there is no direct 
connection between node 1 (row) and node 4 (column) and hence the value zero. 
Similarly the highlighted ‘1’ shows that there is a direct connection between node 4 (row) 
and node 2 (column). In this manner any network can be represented by a 2 dimensional 
NXN matrix where N is the number of nodes in the network. 
 
4.1.2 Random Network 
 
 The Random network model proposed by Erdos and Renyi is generated using an 
existing algorithm in MATLAB. The code for the algorithm is shown in Appendix B 

















4.1.3 Scale Free Network  
 
 The Scale free network model proposed by Barabasi and Albert is generated using 
an existing algorithm in MATLAB. The code of the algorithm is added in Appendix C 
[14]. An example of BA scale free network is shown in figure 4.3 [23]. 
 













4.1.4 Hierarchical Network 
 
 The hierarchical network model as proposed by Ravasz and Barabasi [18] is 
constructed using an algorithm implemented in JAVA. The basic idea behind the 
algorithm is that the hierarchical networks are made of small identical networks. Hence 
any hierarchical network can be considered as a network with repetitive small structures. 
These small repetitive structures will have similar connections within themselves. That is, 
the adjacency matrices of these small structures will be identical. This is possible only 
because we are considering non weighted networks. So, if we can identify the basic 
structure of a hierarchical network, the whole network can be constructed based on the 
specific network structure.  
 
 For example let us consider the network shown in Figure 4.4 [18]. The basic 
module is comprised of 5 nodes. Hence, we can generate the 125 node network, based on 
the 5 node structure.  













The adjacency matrices for the 5-node as well as the 25-node networks are shown below. 
In the 25-node network’s adjacency matrix, we show how the 5-node structure’s 
adjacency matrices repeat itself. 
 
Adjacency matrix of the 5-node module 
 
 
nodes 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 1 
3 1 1 0 1 1 
4 1 1 1 0 1 
5 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Adjacency matrix of the 25-node module 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
2 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
20 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
22 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
 Table 4.1 Adjacency Matrix of the 25 node module 
 
The adjacency matrix of a 5-node basic structure repeats 5 times in the 25 node network 
as shown in Table 4.1. The darkened 1’s show the connections between these five 5-node 
structures. Similarly the 125-node network can be constructed using the basic structure. 
 















Inputs: Adjacency Matrix of Basic Module or Modules – a [] (stored in the array). 
             Number of nodes in the complex network – N. 
  
For each Nn∈ the sequence number of the node relates to the sequence number in the 
array of the adjacency matrix ‘a’. 
The adjacency matrix of node Nn ∈1  is stored in a [1] and Nn ∈1  in a [2] etc. 
 
For k =1 to N (total number of nodes in the complex network) 
• For size of a [k-1] < row > size of a [k] 
o For size of a [k-1] < column > size of a [k] 









4.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF TEST NETWORKS  
 
4.2.1 Degree Distribution 
 
The degree distribution for the Random, BA and Hierarchical network models generated 
are shown in the plots below. Figure 4.5 shows the degree distribution of an ER random 
graph. The random graph model generates a homogeneous network (a Poisson 
distribution), with most of the nodes having a degree equal to average degree <k> = 7.34.  
 
 


















Fig 4.5 Degree distribution of Random Network 
Number of Nodes = 125 










Similarly Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show the degree distributions of BA Scale free and 
hierarchical network models respectively. Here the degree distribution follows a power-
law showing that the BA as well as the hierarchical networks are highly non-
homogeneous. For both these networks, few nodes have high degree, whereas a large 





Fig 4.6 Degree distribution of BA Scale free Network 
Number of Nodes = 125 
Number of Edges = 394 





























Fig 4.7 Degree distribution of Hierarchical Network 
Number of Nodes = 125 
Number of Edges = 394 


























4.2.2 Clustering Coefficient 
 
 Ravasz and Barabasi [18] showed that a network can be quantified to have a 
hierarchical organization if the clustering coefficient follows a scaling law.  
1~)( −kkC  
Hence the curves are plotted for all the three network models under 
consideration. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the organization of clustering in a random 
network and BA scale free network respectively. The graphs clearly show that there is no 
hierarchical organization present in both the ER random model as well as the BA scale 





Fig 4.8 Clustering Coefficient of Random Network 
Number of Nodes = 125 
Number of Edges = 394 



























Fig 4.9 Clustering Coefficient of BA Scale free Network 
Number of Nodes = 125 
Number of Edges = 394 

























Figure 4.10 shows the clustering organization in the hierarchical networks. The graph 
shows that the clustering follows a scaling law in the hierarchical network models 
quantifying the presence of high modularity in these network models like most of the real 
networks. 
 
Fig 4.10 Clustering Coefficient of Hierarchical Network 
Number of Nodes = 125 
Number of Edges = 394 





















CHAPTER V: PARTIAL ATTACK MODEL 
 
 An attack on a node affects all the edges of the node. The attacks modeled so far 
are complete or full degree attacks, where the node is completely removed by making it 
unconnected to the network. This is obtained by removing the edges of the node that is 
attacked. In other words the efficiency of the edges of the node under attack is made zero. 
Hence we can say that the attacks modeled are based on the effective performance of the 
edges of the attacked node.  
 
In all the previous studies [2] [6], the authors focused their study on the full 
degree attacks (K-based attack, L-based attack and the cascade attack). Normally in real 
world, partial attacks can occur. Instead of damaging the whole node, the performance of 
the node is reduced to some extent. The reduction in the performance of the node can be 
modeled by reducing the efficiency of the edges of the node. In this case the efficiency of 
the edges are not directly made to zero making the connection between the nodes useless, 
but is reduced by a degree. In other words, the distance between the nodes is increased or 
the weight of all the edges of the node is increased. The weight of the node characterizes 
the edge that connects the nodes. The lesser the weight of the edge the easier it is for 
information to pass through the nodes using the edge.  Hence we can say that for an edge 
initially carrying certain amount of information, to carry the same amount of information, 
the cost will be higher as it has to travel a longer distance than in normal condition.  
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 For example, suppose an attack of degree 10% is modeled on a node. It reduces 
the performance of the edges of the node by 10%. It will reduce the functionality of the 
edge by 10%. So each time the attack is modeled on a node, the functionality of its edges 
is reduced by 10%. The reduction of the edge functionality can be considered as 
reduction in the ability to communicate using the edge. This can be represented by 
reducing the efficiency of the edge i.e. increasing the weight of the edge. Here we 
modeled the attacks of varying degree from 10 to 100%. The 100% reduction being that 
all the edges of the attacked node are removed making the node unconnected to the 
network. These varying degree attacks are based on degree (K-based), load (L-based) and 
for the cascading attack models as described below. 
 
5.1 K-based partial attack model 
 
 In the K-based attack model, we calculate the degree of each node. Then the 
nodes are attacked according to the ascending order of their degree. Since for varying 
degrees of attack, the edges of a node are not removed but instead the weights are 
increased by a percentage, we consider a parameter ‘effective-k’, which is the sum of all 
the efficiencies of all the edges of each node. Now initially under normal conditions the 
efficiencies of the edges are either ‘1’ or ‘0’. Therefore the degree ‘k’ of a node is equal 




 In this attack model, after an attack is modeled and the efficiencies of the edges 
are reduced, the effective-k is recalculated for all the nodes. Now the node with the 
highest effective-k is attacked. So at each step after an attack, effective-k is calculated. In 
this way at every step of the attack model, we attack the node that has edges with highest 
efficiencies or in other words the node that has the highest efficiency of sending 
information.  
 
5.2 L-based partial attack model 
  
 Similar to that of the K-based varying degree of attacks, in the L-based model we 
recalculate the loads on the nodes after each attack. After an attack, the efficiency of the 
edges of the node that was attacked changes based on the degree of the attack. The 
shortest paths of the network get redistributed resulting in redistribution of the loads. 
Hence after each attack the loads on each node are recalculated and the node with the 
highest load at the time is selected and attacked. In this way at every step of the attack 
model, we attack the node that carries the highest load at that time to make sure the 
damage is highest.  
 
5.3 Cascade partial attack model 
 
 The cascading effect of the varying degree attacks on the node with highest load 
is studied here. That is, instead of removing the edges of the node, the efficiency of the 
edges are reduced by the percentage degree of attack. As explained earlier, even by 
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changing the efficiency of the edges of a node, redistribution of loads can occur, leading 
to a cascading effect. So the cascading effect is studied for varying degrees of attacks 
from 10% to 100%. The parameters studied are: 
 The size of the main cluster of the network. 
 The global efficiency of the network. 
 The System Impact Factor (SIF) quantifying the total percentage of nodes in the 
network working under abnormal state. 
 The Component Impact Factor (CIF) quantifying the effect of an attack on 
individual nodes. 
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CHAPTER VI: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 This chapter outlines all the experimental results along with important 
conclusions. The first two sections of the chapter show the results for the error and attack 
tolerances of static (k-based and L-based) and cascade attacks respectively. The results 
are in agreement with earlier studies, as will be explained in sections to follow. The final 
chapter of this section explains the results obtained by the proposed partial attack model 
with varying degree attacks.  
 
6.1 STATIC (K-BASED & L-BASED) ATTACK 
 
 The error and attack tolerance of three types of networks - Random, BA scale-free 
and Hierarchical networks are tested under the error, K-based and L-based attack models. 
The efficiency of the network is the parameter considered to study the effect of error, K-
based and L-based attacks. Figure 6.1 below shows the behavior of networks under 
random failures and K-based attack. Similarly Figure 6.2 shows the behavior of the 
networks under random failures and L-based attack. 
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Fig 6.2 Error and L-based attack tolerance in three network models 
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From the plots above, we see that for the Random network, there is not much difference 
in behavior both in the error as well as attack mode. Whereas in the case of the 
hierarchical as well as the BA Scale free networks, there is a considerable drop in the 
efficiency with increasing ‘p’, in case of attack (both k as well as L). This confirms that 
the BA scale free and hierarchical networks are very vulnerable to attacks. It can be 
explained by the degree distribution of the network models, which show a power law 
distribution. This means that few nodes in the network have high degree values and when 
these nodes are attacked deliberately, the efficiency of the network drops considerably. 
 
In conclusion, we can infer that the hierarchical as well as the BA Scale free networks are 
robust to errors but are very vulnerable to attacks due their non-homogeneous degree 
distribution. The random networks, since they are more homogeneous show a similar 
behavior to both errors and attacks. 
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 6.2 CASCADE EFFECT 
6.2.1 Size, Efficiency & SIF 
 
When a node is attacked, the attack leads to a network breakdown due to the 
cascading effect. This can be explained by studying the effect of the attack on the 
network with respect to time on three different factors – the size of the main cluster, 
efficiency and the System Impact Factor. The capacity of a node is proportional to the 
initial load of the node and is given by equation. 
,,2,1),0( NjLC jj K==α  
where 1≥α is the tolerance parameter of the network  
and is the load at time 0, initial load. )0(jL
 
The value of alpha is taken to be equal to 1.05. The node to be attacked is based 
on load (L-based). The node that initially carries the highest load is attacked. Figures 6.3 
and 6.4 show the results of cascading attack. 
 





































































From Figures 6.3 and 6.4, we see that the size and the efficiency of the BA scale free 
and hierarchical networks drop significantly with time when compared to random 
networks. It shows that the cascading effect is significantly high in these networks. This 
can be attributed to the non-homogenous degree distribution of these networks. In these 
networks, system integrity is dependent on the key nodes and an attack on the key node 
can lead to network breakdown as shown. 
 
In Figure 6.3, for the hierarchical network, the size drops down to 20% of the original 
size, just by attacking the key node, whereas the SIF is zero meaning that all the other 
nodes are operating on a load below their capacity. This is because the system has broken 
down to small clusters of connected nodes. In case of the BA scale free network model 
and the random network, SIF is almost same with time after the attack. This means that 
the percentage of nodes not functioning at any time is almost equal for the two networks. 
But at the same time the size of the main cluster is far less in case of the BA scale free 
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network, explaining that the size of the main cluster depends on few key nodes for these 
networks. 
 
In conclusion, we can infer that the cascading effect of an attack is high in case of 
hierarchical and BA scale free networks than the random networks. This is attributed to 
their non-homogeneous degree distribution. These results emphasize that for real 
networks, since they have a non-homogeneous degree distribution, a single potential 




The Component Impact Factor (CIF) of any node specifies the effect of the attack 
on that specific node. If there is an attack on node ‘x’, then the effect of this attack at any 
time on node ‘y’ can be obtained by the CIF of the node ‘y’ at that specific time. As an 
example, Figure 6.5 shows the CIF of nodes ‘69’, ‘92’, ‘75’ respectively when the node 
with the highest load is attacked in ER network. 
 
 




























From Figure 6.5, the CIF takes both positive as well as negative values. The negative 
value means that the recalculated load is in fact less than the initial node and vice versa. 
For example node ‘92’, at time t = 1, the CIF is -5 which means that the recalculated load 
is less than the initial load at time t = 1. But for the same node, at time t = 2 the CIF is 
almost equal to 5, which means that the recalculated load at time t = 2 is higher than the 
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initial load. This is an effect of some additional number of nodes malfunctioning from 
time t = 1 to time t = 2. 
 
The significance of the CIF is that in combination with SIF, system size, and efficiency it 
can perform real time monitoring and track the effects of an attack. This can form the 
basis for studying existing critical infrastructure performance under different attack 
scenarios and provide critical information for planning better security. 
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6.3 PARTIAL ATTACKS 
 
 The partial attacks are modeled by not removing the node completely but by 
reducing the performance of the node.  For example an attack of degree 10% is modeled 
by reducing the functionality (efficiency) by 10%. In a similar manner the attacks are 
carried for a varying degrees ranging from 10 to 100%, where 100% denotes a full attack, 
requiring removal of the node. The attacks are modeled on the three network topologies – 
Random, BA scale-free and Hierarchical network models. 
  
6.3.1 K-Based & L-Based Attacks 
 
 The partial k-based and L-based attacks are carried on the three test networks and 































































































































In Figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8, as the degree of the attack is increased from 10% to 100%, the 
drop in the efficiency is increased. This result is common in all three networks. The 
interesting observation is the difference between the plots for 10% and 100% in all the 
three networks. We see that the difference between 10% and 100% for random networks 
is not as high as in case of BA scale free or hierarchical networks.  
 
For explaining the above results in a better manner consider the Figures 6.9 and 6.10 that 
show the plots from 10% and 100% attacks for the three network models and Figures 





















Fig 6.9 Comparison of efficiency for full and partial attacks in 




















































Fig 6.10 Comparison of efficiency for full and partial attacks in BA 
Scale free and Random networks 






















































From Figures 6.9 and 6.10 we see that the performance of the BA Scale free network and 
the Hierarchical networks is considerably improved, especially for the first few attacks in 
case of the reduced degree of attack (10%). This result can be clearly seen from Figures 
6.11 and 6.12, which show that the performance of three networks is almost similar for 
reduced degree 10% initial attacks. 
 
The results are also shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, showing the change in efficiency values 
for the initial attacks. 
  Table 6.1 Efficiency for 100% degree of attack 
Time Hierarchical Random BA-Scale free 
    
0 0.42 0.38 0.39 
1 0.09 0.37 0.38 
2 0.08 0.36 0.36 
3 0.06 0.35 0.33 
4 0.05 0.34 0.31 




Table 6.2 Efficiency for 10% degree of attack  
Time Hierarchical Random BA-Scale free 
0 0.42 0.38 0.39 
1 0.40 0.38 0.39 
2 0.37 0.38 0.39 
3 0.35 0.38 0.38 
4 0.32 0.38 0.38 







The values show the improvement of efficiency for the BA scale free and hierarchical 
networks for reduced attack when compared to the random networks. This behavior can 
be attributed to the topology (i.e. the degree distribution) of the network models. As the 
random networks are homogeneous and has a Poisson degree distribution with all the 
nodes having almost equal degree, the drop in the efficiency is not very prominent from 
10% to 100% attacks. But whereas for the BA scale-free network and the hierarchical 
network the drop is significant because they have a power-law degree distribution. 
 
The conclusion we draw from these observations is that in case of the scale-free and the 
hierarchical networks, if we can identify key nodes and protect them properly, thereby 
reducing the effect of an attack on these nodes, the vulnerability of these networks to 
attacks can be reduced considerably.  
 
Note: Similar types of results are obtained for the L-based attacks and the plots are 
shown in Appendix A. 
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6.3.2 Cascade Attack 
 
The cascading failures are common in most of the complex networks. When a 
node is attacked, the attack leads to a network breakdown due to the cascading effect. 
The capacity of node is proportional to the initial load of the node and is given by 
equation. 
,,2,1),0( NjLC jj K==α  
where 1≥α is the tolerance parameter of the network 
and is the load at time 0, initial load. )0(jL
 The node with the highest initial load is attacked. The cascading effect of different 
degree of attacks is studied for the three network models – Random, BA scale-free and 
Hierarchical network models. The results presented below are for a low value of alpha = 
1.05. The capacity is dependent on the value of alpha. The higher the value of alpha, the 
higher is the capacity. The plots are final values of efficiency, size and SIF obtained after 
either the network stabilizes or is broken down to small parts. 
 


































































From Figures 6.13 we see that for very low values of alpha = 1.05, the efficiency drops 
rapidly for the BA Scale free and the Random networks, where as it drops slowly in case 
of the Hierarchical networks. The cascade effect is low for hierarchical networks 
compared to the scale free or random networks in case of reduced degree attack (10%-
80%) even for a small value of alpha = 1.05. The capacity of nodes and thus the effect of 
a cascading attack is dependent on the value of alpha. An extremely large alpha can 
reduce the cascade effect to zero, but is not practically possible due the limitations of 
cost.  
 
Similarly from Figure 6.14 we see that the size of the main cluster also drops rapidly in 
case of the BA and Scale free networks. Whereas in case of the Hierarchical networks the 
size of the main cluster is maintained from 10-90% of degree of attacks and rapidly drops 
for 100% attack. This explains that the network is totally dependent on a single node. If 
this node is well protected, the system can be kept largely connected. 
 
The conclusion we draw from the above results is that if we can identify the key nodes in 
real networks and protect them, reducing the effect of an attack, the cascading effect can 
be considerably reduced. The major factor is that it can be obtained at a very small alpha 
value. 
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6.3.3 Effect of Alpha 
 
The cascade effect of an attack directly depends on the value of alpha, since the 
capacity of nodes is determined by the value of alpha. Though an extremely large value 
of alpha is not possible to select, due to the limitations imposed by cost, we have tried to 
summarize the effect of alpha on the cascading effect in the three network topologies. 
 
So far all the results obtained and discussed are for a value of alpha of 1.05. The 
higher the value alpha the smaller is the cascading effect of an attack. The variation of the 
system size and the efficiency of the three networks with increasing alpha is plotted. The 
values plotted are the final values, the values at which the system stabilizes due to the 
cascading effect of the attack. Figures 6.16 and 6.17 for the normal or full degree attacks 




Fig 6.16 Variation of System Size with Alpha under Full degree attack 
























Fig 6.17 Variation of Efficiency with Alpha under Full degree attack 























Fig 6.18 Variation of System Size with Alpha under 10% degree attack 



















Fig 6.19 Variation of Efficiency with Alpha under 10% degree attack 



























From Figures 6.16 and 6.17, the system size and the efficiency improve with the 
increasing value of alpha in case of the Random and BA scale free networks. For the 
random networks the cascading effect is negligible for a value of alpha 1.2, whereas for 
the BA scale free network models it is higher at a value of almost 1.5. This can be 
attributed to different network topologies of the network models. 
 
In case of the hierarchical networks, from Figures 6.16 and 6.17, the size as well as the 
efficiency drop to a very low value and are constant with increasing value of alpha. This 
is because the network is dependent on the key nodes and once the attack damages these 
key nodes the network is broken down. Whereas from Figures 6.18 and 6.19, we see that 
for reduced attacks, the size and the efficiency is improved significantly and is a constant 
as the alpha value increases.  
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We conclude that if we identify and protect the key node in the hierarchical network 
model, the cascading effect can be reduced considerably. Also the network can be well 
protected even for small values of alpha. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 From the results obtained and discussions above, it is clearly shown that the error 
and attack tolerance of a network can be attributed to the topology of the network. 
Further it is shown that the scale free networks are vulnerable to attacks – both under the 
static attacks as well as the cascading effect attacks. The hierarchical networks that have 
both the power law degree distribution as well as the high modularity characteristics of 
real networks are highly vulnerable to attacks, since they depend on few key nodes. 
These results clearly show the need to carefully design the protection measures for real 
networks. Both the hierarchical as well as the BA scale free networks show much 
improved performance under reduced degree of attacks and are comparable to that of the 
random networks under such conditions. Hence if we are able to protect the key nodes in 
these networks the performance of the networks can be highly improved. In particular the 
cascading effect of an attack can be considerably reduced by protecting the key nodes in 
the hierarchical networks. The effect of an attack on the system as well as other nodes 
(components) is quantified using the impact factors. 
 
 The impact factors and different attack models can be used to test and identify the 
effect of different attacks on existing real scenario networks such as the western power 
grid, transport systems, Internet, WWW etc. An analysis of this type can help plan for 
critical malfunctions that may occur in real networks. Since the advent of the 9-11 attack 
there is considerable emphasis on protecting the national critical infrastructures. A 
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Fig A.1 Partial L-based Attack Analysis on Hierarchical Network 


















































Fig A.2 Partial L-based Attack Analysis on Random Network 
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Fig A.3 Patial L-based Attack Analysis on BA scale free Network 
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Fig A.4 Comparison of efficiency for full and partial attacks in 



















































Fig A.5 Comparison of efficiency for full and partial attacks in BA 





























































































MATLAB code for Erdos Renyi Random Network Model [Pablo Blinder, 2003] 
 
function [G]=erdosRenyi(nv,p,Kreg) 
%Funciton [G]=edosRenyi(nv,p,Kreg) generates a random graph based on 
%the Erdos and Renyi algoritm where all possible pairs of 'nv' nodes are 
%connected with probability 'p'.  
% 
% Inputs: 
%   nv - number of nodes  
%   p  - rewiring probability 
%   Kreg - initial node degree of for regular graph (use 1 or even numbers) 
% 
% Output: 
%   G is a structure inplemented as data structure in this as well as other 
%   graph theory algorithms. 
%   G.Adj   - is the adjacency matrix (1 for connected nodes, 0 otherwise). 
%   G.x and G.y -   are row vectors of size nv wiht the (x,y) coordinates of 
%                   each node of G. 
%   G.nv    - number of vertices in G 
%   G.ne    - number of edges in G 
% 
%Created by Pablo Blinder. blinderp@bgu.ac.il 
% 
%Last update 25/01/2005 
 
%build regular lattice  
 
nv = input('Enter the number of the nodes:'); 
p = input('Enter the probability of rewiring:'); 










%find connected pairs 
[v1,v2]=find(A); 
% P=permPairs(nv);%my version is faster 






%cycle trough disconnected pairs 
disconPairs=[v1(Dis),v2(Dis)]; 
for n=1:nDis 
    %choose one of the vertices from the disconnected pair 
    i=ceil(rand*size(disconPairs,1)); 
    j=logical(1+rand>0.5); 
    vDisToRec=disconPairs(i,j); 
    %find non adjacent vertices and reconnect 
    adj=[find(A(:,vDisToRec)) ; find(A(vDisToRec,:))']; 
    nonAdj=setdiff(1:nv,adj); 
    vToRec=nonAdj(ceil(rand*length(nonAdj))); 
    S=sort([vDisToRec vToRec]); 
    A(S(1),S(2))=1; 
end 
[x,y]=getNodeCoordinates(nv); 













%function matrix = scalefreegraph(n,fc); 
% matrix = scalefreegraph(n,fc) 
% yields matrix of scale-free graph 
% with n nodes 
% fc is a factor determining final density 
% Author : Marcus Kai ser Date : 8 . 1 2 . 0 2 
 
n=input('Enter the number of nodes in the network: '); 
fc = input('Enter the factor for final density: '); 
 
NODES = n ; 
INITIALNODES = 3; 
 
% generate initial matrix(two nodes; undirected link) 
matrix = zeros (NODES,NODES) ; 
matrix ( 1 , 2 ) = 1 ; 
matrix ( 2 , 1 ) = 1 ; 
matrix ( 1 , 3 ) = 1 ; 
matrix ( 3 , 1 ) = 1 ; 
matrix ( 2 , 3 ) = 1 ; 
matrix ( 3 , 2 ) = 1 ; 
nodes_incl= [1;2;3] ; 
 
% aggregation of nodes to initial mat r ix 
m = INITIALNODES ; 
k = zeros (NODES, 1 ) ; 
 
for i = 1 :m 
k(i) = (sum(matrix(i,:))+sum(matrix(:,i))); 
end; 
 
while m < NODES 
m = m + 1 ; 
for i = 1 :m-1 
P = k(i)/sum( k ); 
if (rand(1,1) <= P*fc) 
k(i) = k(i) + 2 ; 
k(m) = k(m) + 2 ; 
matrix (i ,m) = 1 ; 
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matrix (m, i ) = 1 ; 
end ; % if 
end ; % for 
end ; % while m 
 
csvwrite('BA-test',matrix); 
edges = sum(sum(matrix)) 
return ; 
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